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Abstract When bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant
features for two different tasks) occur occasionally among
univalent stimuli, performance is slowed on subsequent
univalent stimuli even if they have no overlapping stimulus
features. This finding has been labeled the bivalency effect.
It indexes an adjustment of cognitive control, but the under-
lying mechanism is not well understood yet. The purpose of
the present study was to shed light on this question, using
event-related potentials. We used a paradigm requiring pre-
dictable alternations between three tasks, with bivalent stim-
uli occasionally occurring on one task. The results revealed
that the bivalency effect elicited a sustained parietal positiv-
ity and a frontal negativity, a neural signature that is typical
for control processes implemented to resolve interference.
We suggest that the bivalency effect reflects interference,
which may be caused by episodic context binding.
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Cognitive control is the ability to adjust performance flexi-
bly according to momentary requirements. It enables us to
select goal-relevant features while inhibiting irrelevant ones.
When a conflict is encountered, adjustment of cognitive
control does not only affect performance for processing
the current conflict-loaded event. It may also affect the
processing of subsequent events (e.g., Botvinick, Braver,
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Egner, 2007, 2008). For
instance, cognitive control is not only adjusted for trials with
bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two
different tasks; Jersild, 1927; Meiran, 2008). It is also adjusted
for subsequent trials with univalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli
with relevant features for one task) even if they have no
overlapping features with the bivalent stimuli (Meier,
Rey-Mermet, Woodward, Müri, & Gutbrod, 2013; Meier,
Woodward, Rey-Mermet, & Graf, 2009; Rey-Mermet &
Meier, 2012a, 2012b; Woodward, Meier, Tipper, & Graf,
2003; Woodward, Metzak, Meier, & Holroyd, 2008; see
Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012a, for a review). It is, however,
unclear how the latter adjustment of cognitive control—
labeled the bivalency effect —is implemented. The purpose
of the present study was to shed light on this question.
In the previous studies investigating the bivalency effect,
participants were asked to repeatedly switch between three
binary decision tasks (Grundy et al., 2011; Meier et al.,
2009; Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a, 2012b; Woodward et
al., 2003; Woodward et al., 2008). For example, participants
were asked to perform a task triplet consisting of a color
decision (red vs. blue), a parity decision (odd vs. even), and
a case decision (uppercase vs. lowercase; see Fig. 1 for an
example). The tasks were presented in the same order and
typically involved univalent stimuli (i.e., red or blue sym-
bols for the color decision, black numerals for the parity
decision, and black letters for the case decision). However,
for some case decisions, the letters were displayed in either
red or blue print color, thus turning them into bivalent
stimuli. The results revealed the bivalency effect—that is,
a performance slowing for all univalent trials following
bivalent stimuli, including those with stimuli that shared
no relevant stimulus features with the bivalent stimuli (i.e.,
the parity decision trials; see Woodward et al., 2003). This
finding was extended to different types of tasks (size,
vowel/consonant), to a different type of bivalent stimuli
(large/small letters), and to a different modality (auditory;
Meier et al., 2009). Moreover, the bivalency effect is not
dependent on the conflict created by overlapping responses,
because it also occurs on univalent trials that share no
A. Rey-Mermet : B. Meier (*)
Department of Psychology and Center for Cognition, Learning,
and Memory, University of Bern, Muesmattstr. 45,
3000 Bern 9, Switzerland
e-mail: beat.meier@psy.unibe.ch
T. Koenig
Department of Psychiatric Neurophysiology, University Hospital
of Psychiatry, and Center for Cognition, Learning, and Memory,
University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2013) 13:575–583
DOI 10.3758/s13415-013-0160-z
response features with the bivalent stimuli (Rey-Mermet &
Meier, 2012a).
So far, only two studies have investigated the neural
correlates of the bivalency effect. Using functional mag-
netic resonance imagery (fMRI), Woodward et al.
(2008) showed that the bivalency effect was associated
with activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(dACC), a brain area typically involved in adjustment of
cognitive control (see Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick,
Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Using event-related potentials
(ERPs), Grundy et al. (2011) investigated the time
course of ERP activity that corresponds to the anterior
cingulate cortex activity reported in the fMRI study.
They showed that the bivalency effect was associated
with three different ERP deflections at frontal elec-
trodes: a larger negative deflection that peaked approx-
imately 100 ms after stimulus onset and two smaller
negative deflections that peaked approximately 375 and
500 ms after stimulus onset. Source localizations
showed activity in the temporal junction for the first
ERP deflection and in the dACC for the last two ERP
deflections, thus complementing the fMRI results.
However, these results did not consider the specific
trajectory of the bivalency effect. Although Meier et al.
(2009) showed that the bivalency effect endured at least
across the four task triplets following bivalent stimuli,
the results also revealed a sharp decline from the first to
the second task triplet following a bivalent stimulus.
After that, the bivalency effect remained stable (see also
Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012a). This suggests that the
bivalency effect involves two different components: one
that is short-lived, most likely related to an orienting
response caused by the infrequence of bivalent stimuli
(cf. Notebaert et al., 2009; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011;
Nùñez Castellar, Kühn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010) and
one that is long-lived and reflects a subsequent adjust-
ment of cognitive control (i.e., the bivalency effect
proper).
The purpose of the present study was to use ERPs to
investigate the processes underlying the bivalency effect
proper. To this end, we focused on the bivalency effect
unconfounded by a potential orienting response. The
general method involved three blocks with regular
switches between a color decision on symbols, a parity
decision on numerals, and a case decision on letters. In
the first and third blocks (the pure blocks), all stimuli
were univalent. In the second block (the mixed block),
some letters for the case decisions appeared in red or
blue color, which turned them into bivalent stimuli. As
compared with the ERP study by Grundy et al. (2011),
we implemented two changes to keep the orienting
response as low as possible. First, we informed partic-
ipants about the presence of bivalent stimuli, and we
specifically instructed them to ignore color information
and to focus on making case decisions. Second, we
excluded the first task triplet immediately following bivalent
stimuli from the analyses.
Since the bivalency effect reflects an adjustment of
cognitive control triggered by bivalent stimuli, the
slowing on subsequent univalent stimuli is assumed to
be the expression of some kind of interference (Grundy
et al., 2011; Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012a; Rey-Mermet
& Meier, 2012a, 2012b; Woodward et al., 2008). In
ERP research, three components that represent a signa-
ture of interference are typically discussed: the N2, the
N450, and the sustained potential (SP). The N2 compo-
nent represents a negative fronto-central deflection that
emerges between 250 and 350 ms after stimulus onset
(Clayson & Larson, 2011; Gehring, Gratton, Coles, &
Donchin, 1992; Kopp, Rist, & Mattler, 1996; Spapé,
Band, & Hommel, 2011). The N450 is also a fronto-
central negative-going deflection that peaks approxi-
mately 450 ms after stimulus onset (Larson, Kaufman,
& Perlstein, 2009; Liotti, Woldroff, Perez, & Mayberg,
2000; Markela-Lerenc et al., 2004; West, 2003; West,
Bowry, & McConville, 2004; West, Jakubek, Wymbs,
Perry, & Moore, 2005). The SP is a more tonic and
sustained potential and reflects a frontal negativity and a
parietal positivity approximately 600 ms after stimulus
onset (Larson et al., 2009; Liotti et al., 2000; West,
2003; West et al., 2005).
Functionally, the N2 is related to response interference
(e.g., Van Veen & Carter, 2002) and the N450 is related to
stimulus-specific interference (e.g., Brass, Ullsperger,
Knoesche, von Cramon, & Phillips, 2005), while the SP
has been related specifically to control processes
implemented to resolve interference (Larson et al., 2009;
Wylie, Javitt, & Foxe, 2003). Previous research has shown
that response interference is not sufficient to explain the
bivalency effect (Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a). Moreover,
the bivalency effect is not restricted to the bivalent stimulus
(or to univalent stimuli with overlapping stimulus features;
e.g., Woodward et al., 2003). Rather, the bivalency effect is
related to control processes that are implemented to resolve
interference on subsequent task triplets. Thus, we expected
most likely to find the SP component.
Method
Participants
The participants were 20 right-handed students (16 women;
mean age=22.1 years, SD=3.3) from the University of
Bern. They were recruited from the departmental participant
pool and received course credits for participation. All of
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them had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity
and reported no evidence of neurological compromise.
The study was approved by the local ethics committee.
Informed written consent was obtained from each
participant.1
Materials
For the color decision, the stimuli were the symbols %,
#, *, and §, each displayed in either blue or red. For the
parity decision, the stimuli were the numerals 1 through
8, each displayed in black. For the case decision, the
stimuli were the upper- or lowercase consonants d, f, r,
and t, each displayed in black (cf. Meier et al., 2009).
We created a set of eight bivalent stimuli by presenting
the same four consonants (d, f, r, t) in either blue or red
and in either upper- or lowercase. All stimuli were
displayed at the center of the computer screen in 60-
point Times New Roman font.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were informed
that the experiment involved three different tasks: color
decisions about symbols, parity decisions about numerals,
and case decisions about letters. They were instructed to
press one of two computer keys (b and n) with their index
and middle fingers, respectively, for each of the three tasks.
Half of the participants were required to use the right hand,
the other half the left hand, in order to negate activations
solely attributable to the act of responding. The mapping
information, printed on paper, was displayed below the
computer screen throughout the experiment. Participants
were further informed that, for some of the case decisions,
the letters would be presented in color. They were specifi-
cally instructed to ignore color information and to focus on
making case decisions.
After these instructions, a block of 40 task triplets was
presented for practice. Each task triplet required making a
color decision, a parity decision, and a case decision, always
in the same order, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The stimulus for
each task was randomly determined and displayed for
1,500 ms. Then the screen blanked for 500 ms, and the next
stimulus appeared. After the practice block and a brief
break, each participant completed three experimental blocks
without any break between blocks. The first block included
42 task triplets, with the first 2 task triplets serving as
“warm-up” sequences, which were discarded from the
analyses. The second and third blocks had only 40 task
triplets each.
For the first and third blocks (the pure blocks), only
univalent stimuli were presented. For the second block
(the mixed block), stimuli were univalent except on 20 %
of the case decisions in which bivalent stimuli (i.e., red or
blue letters) appeared. Bivalent stimuli were determined
randomly and without replacement. Task triplets with biva-
lent stimuli were evenly interspersed among the 40 task
triplets of the block, occurring in every fifth task triplet—
specifically, in the 3rd, 8th, 13th, 18th, 23th, 28th, 33th, and
38th triplets.
EEG recording and processing
Participants were seated in an electrically shielded, sound-
proofed, and air-conditioned recording room in front of a
computer display (distance 60 cm). The EEG was digitized
(500 Hz, 0.015–250 Hz band-pass) and stored from 62
electrodes located according to an extended version of the
International 10–20 System using Brainproducts EEG sys-
tem. Interelectrode impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. All
electrodes were recorded against Fz and were grounded to
1 Originally, we had designed the study to address an additional ques-
tion—namely, how retroactive and proactive control (cf. Braver, 2012;
Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007) differ in terms of the recruited neuro-
nal modulations. In a first condition (the retroactive condition), partic-
ipants were asked to perform the case decisions and not the color
decision when encountering bivalent stimuli. In another condition
(the proactive control condition; see Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012b),
they were instructed to press the h- key when encountering the bivalent
stimuli. We counterbalanced the order of these conditions across two
sessions that were separated by 1 week. Half of the participants
performed the retroactive condition in the first session and the proac-
tive condition in the second session. The other half of the participants
performed the proactive condition in the first session and the retroac-
tive condition in the second session. It turned out that counterbalancing
worked properly for the retroactive condition (i.e., the pattern of results
was similar across conditions), but not for the proactive condition.
Therefore, we focus exclusively on the results of the retroactive con-
dition (i.e., the bivalency effect).
Fig. 1 Example of one univalent task triplet. Participants carried out a
color decision (red vs. blue) on symbols, a parity decision (odd vs.
even) on numerals, and a case decision (upper- vs. lowercase) on
letters. On a bivalent task triplet (not pictured here), the letters were
presented in red or blue print color
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2013) 13:575–583 577
AFz. Eye movements were monitored with two additional
electrooculogram channels.
First, for offline data analysis, an independent component
analysis (ICA) based eye movement correction was applied
(Delorme, Sejnowski, & Makeig, 2007). Across partici-
pants, between two and four ICA components were related
to eye movements and were removed. Further artifacts were
identified by visual inspection. The data were filtered offline
with a band-pass filter from 0.5 to 20 Hz and recomputed
against average reference. Since the reaction times (RTs)
were in the 600- to 800-ms range, we report only artifact-
free ERP effects occurring from 200 ms before stimulus
presentation to 800 ms after stimulus presentation for cor-
rect responses.
Behavioral and ERP data analysis
For each participant, the accuracy rates, the median RTs, and
the ERPs for correct responses were computed for each task
and each block. To account for general training effects, we
averaged the data from the pure blocks 1 and 3 for each task.
To eliminate the orienting response, the task triplets
containing bivalent stimuli and those immediately following
bivalent stimuli were excluded. The corresponding task
triplets in the pure blocks 1 and 3 were also excluded.
Additionally, for the behavioral data, error rates, and median
RTs for bivalent case decisions were computed.
Behavioral and ERP statistical analysis
For the behavioral statistical analysis, we first conducted a t-
test comparing bivalent and univalent case decisions from
the mixed block in order to test the impact of bivalent
stimuli, as compared with univalent stimuli (cf. Jersild,
1927; Meiran, 2008).2 To investigate the bivalency effect,
we carried out a two-way within-subjects analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) on univalent stimuli, with the factors block
(pure, mixed) and task (color, parity, case). An alpha level of
.05 was used for all statistical tests. Greenhouse–Geisser
corrections are reported where appropriate, and effect sizes
are expressed as partial η2 values.
For the ERP statistical analysis, we used the software
RAGU (Randomization Graphical User Interface; Koenig,
Kottlow, Stein, & Melie-Garcia, 2011; Koenig & Melie-
Garcia, 2009, 2010). To investigate the bivalency effect,
we first performed a topographic ANOVA (TANOVA), nor-
malized across electrodes, as a global test for topographic
differences (Strik, Fallgatter, Brandeis, & Pascual-Marqui,
1998; Wirth et al., 2008). This TANOVA involved a 2×3
design, with the within-subjects factors block (pure, mixed)
and task (color, parity, case). Then we conducted a global
duration test in order to indicate the maximum duration of
consecutive significant time points that can be expected
above the chance level .05 (Koenig et al., 2011; Koenig &
Melie-Garcia, 2009, 2010). TANOVA differences whose
consecutive time points were significant were further ex-
plored using paired topographic maps (t-maps), which in-
form about the scalp distribution of the signal-to-noise ratio
of an effect.
Results
Behavioral results
Performance on bivalent stimuli
In the mixed block, participants were significantly slower on
bivalent stimuli than on the corresponding univalent stimuli
(i.e., on the univalent case decisions from the mixed block),
t (19)=4.97, p<.001 (Mbivalent=814 ms, SE=46; Munivalent=
629 ms, SE=26). Moreover, they were significantly less
accurate on bivalent stimuli than on the corresponding uni-
valent stimuli, t (19)=−2.71, p<.05 (Mbivalent=.91, SE=.03;
Munivalent=.99, SE=.005).
Performance on univalent stimuli
Results are summarized in Table 1. The ANOVA on the RTs
of univalent stimuli revealed a significant main effect of
block, F(1, 19)=18.18, p<.001, η2=.49, and of task, F(2,
38)=14.20, p<.001, η2=.43. The interaction between these
factors was not significant, F(2, 38)=1.89, p=.16, η2=.09.
Thus, performance was significantly slowed (M=49 ms,
SE=12) for all three tasks in the mixed block, as compared
with the pure block. This confirms the presence of the
bivalency effect.
The ANOVA on the accuracy of the univalent stimuli
showed a significant main effect of task, F(2, 38)=13.55, p
2 By design, it was not possible to compare ERPs between univalent
and bivalent trials because there were only eight bivalent trials.
Table 1 Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) for the univalent task
triplets in the pure block and in the mixed block (with standard errors
in parentheses)
Task Pure block Mixed block Difference
Color 662 (24) 735 (37) 73 (20)
Parity 675 (30) 714 (34) 39 (14)
Case 593 (20) 629 (26) 36 (15)
Note. Means are based on individual median reaction times of correct
responses out of 21 decisions. The task triplets immediately following
bivalent stimuli in the mixed block and the corresponding task triplets
in the pure block were excluded.
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<.001, η2=.42. Thus, participants were more accurate on the
case decisions (M=.99, SE=.004) than on the color and
parity decisions (M=.94, SE=.01, and M=.95, SE=.01,
respectively). No other main effect or interaction was sig-
nificant, Fs<1, ps>.05, η2<.02. These results indicate that
no speed–accuracy trade-off compromised the critical RT
effects.
ERP results
Performance on univalent stimuli
The analysis of the bivalency effect was based on an average
of 35.5, 35.6, and 36.2 (range=27–41) valid univalent trials
for the color, parity, and case decisions per participant from
the pure block, and 16.8, 18.1, and 18.7 (range=13–21)
valid univalent trials for the color, parity, and case decisions
per participant from the mixed block. The TANOVA and the
global duration test revealed a significant main effect of
block in the time window 606–774 ms (p<.05). Further-
more, the main effect of task was also significant in two time
windows: 126–570 and 670–778 ms (ps<.05). No time
window was significant for the interaction, p>.05. Thus, a
significant difference between the univalent task triplets
from the mixed block and those from the pure block was
found in a time window about 650 ms after stimulus onset.
Figure 2 shows the grand-mean traces of the univalent task
triplets from the mixed block and those from the pure block
at selected electrodes and the t-map of differences between
the two blocks for this time window. The figure shows that
the largest positive differences occurred at parietal elec-
trodes (largest t-value at electrode P8, t-value=2.53) and
the most negative differences occurred at frontal electrodes
(smallest t-value at electrode Fpz, t-value=−2.41). Thus, the
bivalency effect was associated with a frontal negativity and
a parietal positivity about 650 ms after stimulus onset.
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to use ERPs in order to
examine the processes underlying the bivalency effect prop-
er. The first task triplet following bivalent stimuli was ex-
cluded from the analyses in order to eliminate the potential
influence of an orienting response resulting from the infre-
quent bivalent stimuli and to focus on the long-lasting
component of the bivalency effect.
The behavioral results showed that performance was
slowed on univalent stimuli after bivalent stimuli were
presented, even on those stimuli that had no overlapping
stimulus features with the bivalent stimuli. This replicates
the long-lasting nature of the bivalency effect (Meier et al.,
2009). The ERP results revealed that the bivalency effect
was associated with a frontal negativity and a parietal pos-
itivity approximately 650 ms after stimulus onset. This
neural signature reflects the SP component usually found
when interference is increased (Liotti et al., 2000; West,
2003; West et al., 2005). More specifically, this component
has been related to control processes implemented to resolve
interference (Larson et al., 2009; Wylie et al., 2003). There-
fore, the present results suggest that when the orienting
response is eliminated, the bivalency effect reflects control
processes implemented to resolve interference.
According to the current theories of cognitive control,
interference typically stems from divergent stimulus or re-
sponse features (cf. Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994;
Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner, 2007, 2008; Hommel, 2004;
Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport,
2003; see Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen,
2010). Thus, after a bivalent stimulus is encountered, biva-
lent stimulus features will be activated on the univalent trials
that share a stimulus or response feature with the bivalent
stimulus. These bivalent stimulus features will interfere with
trial processing, because they are irrelevant for task execu-
tion. Thus, they will be inhibited (Allport et al., 1994;
Allport & Wylie, 1999, 2000; Wylie & Allport, 2000), or
they will require an additional task decision process in order
to select the relevant task (Braverman & Meiran, 2010;
Fagot, 1994; Meiran, Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 2008; Rogers
& Monsell, 1995). In both cases, performance will be
slowed, but only for the univalent trials sharing relevant
features with the bivalent stimuli. However, the bivalency
effect is also found on the univalent trials sharing no rele-
vant stimulus or response features with the bivalent stimuli
(e.g., Meier et al., 2009; Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a;
Woodward et al., 2003). Therefore, the interference as pro-
posed in the current cognitive control accounts cannot fully
explain the bivalency effect.
Another possibility would be that participants are
monitoring for bivalent stimuli and that this monitoring
interferes with the processing of univalent trials (e.g.,
Guynn, 2003; Smith, 2003). However, in a recent study,
we found that monitoring for bivalent stimuli did not
result in the bivalency effect. In this study, we asked
participants to respond with a different key when en-
countering bivalent stimuli (Meier & Rey-Mermet,
2012b). The results showed a performance slowing for
the first task triplet that immediately followed the biva-
lent stimuli, probably reflecting an orienting response
(cf. Notebaert et al., 2009; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011;
Nùñez Castellar et al., 2010). In addition, on subsequent
task triplets, a performance slowing was found, but only
on those univalent stimuli that shared relevant features
with bivalent stimuli (i.e., the color and case decisions).
Therefore, interference due to monitoring does not result
in the same pattern of slowing as the bivalency effect.
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Consequently, the interference underlying the bivalency
effect must stem from a different source, beyond stimulus,
response, or task features. For example, it might result from
the reactivation of the context created by occasionally en-
countering bivalent stimuli. We have suggested that a stim-
ulus and a task are bound to the context in which they occur,
resulting in episodic context binding that is updated again
and again (Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012a; Meier et al., 2009;
Rey-Mermet & Meier, 2012a). In the particular paradigm
used to assess the bivalency effect, from the perspective of a
participant, the context consists of the whole task triplet and
typically involves univalent stimuli. Stimuli and tasks are
bound to this context, which is reactivated on a subsequent
task triplet. The occurrence of a bivalent stimulus creates a
more demanding context. Thus, on subsequent task triplets,
the representation of the—now conflict-loaded—context is
reactivated and interferes with processing the univalent tri-
als. This slows down performance and results in the
bivalency effect. Thus, according to the episodic context
binding account, the bivalency effect reflects interference
caused by the reactivation of the more demanding context
created by bivalent stimuli. Although this explanation is still
somewhat speculative, it is in line with the results of the
present study. Moreover, it is also consistent with a recent
study in which we tested the bivalency effect in amnesic
patients. We hypothesized that due to their severe problems
in memory binding, amnesic patients would fail to show a
normal bivalency effect. The results were in line with this
prediction (Meier et al., 2013). Nevertheless, further evalu-
ation of the episodic context account is necessary. For
example, it would be interesting to test whether the sequen-
tial presentation of the tasks is necessary for episodic con-
text binding to occur, or whether the bivalency effect would
end quickly if one of the tasks in a triplet were also changed,
since that would change the context. Moreover, it would
also be interesting to follow up the present study using fMRI
in order to further investigate the neural correlates of epi-
sodic context binding.
Fig. 2 Neural signature of the bivalency effect proper. Upper panels:
Grand-mean traces of the univalent task triplets for the pure block
(black lines) and the mixed block (red lines) at selected electrodes
(Fpz and P8). Lower panels: Topographic map (t-map) of the bivalency
effect proper in the significant time window 606–774 ms detected by
the TANOVA and the global duration test. Red areas represent an
increase in activity; blue areas represent a decrease in activity
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The present results extend the findings on cognitive
control effects following a conflict, such as the conflict
adaptation effects in the Stroop, Simon, and flanker tasks.3
Similar to conflict adaptation in the Stroop task, the
bivalency effect is also associated with the SP component
in ERPs (Larson et al., 2009). Per definition, the bivalency
effect involves a task conflict triggered by bivalent stimuli.
In the Stroop task, incongruent stimuli also trigger a task
conflict (Seinhauser & Hübner, 2009). Thus, on both occa-
sions, the SP component seems to reflect control processes
implemented to resolve interference due to a task conflict. In
contrast, conflict adaptation in both the Simon and flanker
tasks is typically associated with the N2 component, and this
component is interpreted as interference due to a response
conflict (Clayson & Larson, 2012; Spapé et al., 2011).
Importantly, the N2 component was not present for the
bivalency effect, which is consistent with previous findings
that demonstrated that the bivalency effect occurs whether
or not a response conflict is present (Rey-Mermet & Meier,
2012a). Thus, response interference is not critical for the
occurrence of the bivalency effect. However, in order to
compare the bivalency effect directly with the conflict ad-
aptation effect, further research is required in which both
paradigms are closely matched.
As in the previous studies, the present study focused on
retroactive cognitive control (cf. Braver, 2012; Braver et al.,
2007; but see Meier & Rey-Mermet, 2012b). An interesting
avenue for future research is to determine the commonalities
and differences between retroactive and proactive control, a
control mode in which goal relevant information is actively
maintained in a sustained manner before a cognitively de-
manding event occurs.
In sum, the findings of the present study provide evi-
dence that the bivalency effect is associated with a neural
signature related specifically to control processes
implemented to resolve interference. In line with previous
findings, this suggests that the bivalency effect reflects
interference caused by the reactivation of the more demand-
ing context created by bivalent stimuli.
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